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Abstract
During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, decision-makers had access to mathematical and computational models that were not available in previous
pandemics in 1918, 1957, and 1968. How did models contribute to policy and action during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic? Modelling
encountered six primary challenges: (i) expectations of modelling were not clearly deﬁned; (ii) appropriate real-time data were not readily
available; (iii) modelling results were not generated, shared, or disseminated in time; (iv) decision-makers could not always decipher the
structure and assumptions of the models; (v) modelling studies varied in intervention representations and reported results; and (vi) modelling
studies did not always present the results or outcomes that are useful to decision-makers. However, there were also seven general successes:
(i) modelling characterized the role of social distancing measures such as school closure; (ii) modelling helped to guide data collection; (iii)
modelling helped to justify the value of the vaccination programme; (iv) modelling helped to prioritize target populations for vaccination; (v)
modelling addressed the use of antiviral medications; (vi) modelling helped with health system preparedness planning; and (vii) modellers and
decision-makers gained a better understanding of how to work with each other. In many ways, the 2009 pandemic served as practice and a
learning opportunity for both modellers and decision-makers. Modellers can continue working with decision-makers and other stakeholders
to help overcome these challenges, to be better prepared when the next emergency inevitably arrives.
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Introduction
During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, decision-makers had access
to mathematical and computational models that were not
available in the previous 1918, 1957 and 1968 pandemics. As
soon as news about the novel inﬂuenza strain emerged from
Mexico in the spring of 2009, inﬂuenza modellers around the
world sprang into action. Some decision-making organizations
already had in-house modelling capabilities. Others, such as the
US Department of Health and Human Services, the US
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the
World Health Organization (WHO), invited outside modellers
to temporarily embed in their response operations. The use of
models to assist infectious disease control strategy and
policy-making was certainly not new, and many other profes-
sions and industries (e.g. meteorology, manufacturing, ﬁnance,
retail, aerospace, and military) have long relied on models
when making major decisions [1,2]. However, 2009 was the
ﬁrst time that models could contribute to a worldwide
emergency response to a major infectious disease threat.
However, the question remains: how did models contribute
to policy and action during the 2009 pandemic? The pandemic
ended up being milder than originally anticipated, motivating
some to decry the considerable money, time and resources
consumed by the response. Some asked, why did the models
not correctly predict the pandemic severity? Moreover, some
critics blamed modellers for not providing adequate insights
[3,4]. Dissatisfaction with inaccurate predictions has even led
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some critics to suggest that the ‘WHO’s decision to declare a
pandemic was at least partially inﬂuenced by a desire to boost
the proﬁts of the pharmaceutical industry’ [5].
Were these criticisms on target? Should modelling not be an
integral part of an epidemic emergency response, or instead
was modelling mis-utilized? Did decision-makers not make full
and appropriate use of modelling and simulation? Did model-
lers not engage the decision-makers optimally? What should
the role of modelling be in future epidemics? A review of the
challenges and successes of the 2009 H1N1 inﬂuenza pan-
demic, and the lessons learned, can help to answer these
questions for future emergency epidemic control.
The Challenges
Challenge 1: expectations of modelling were not clearly
deﬁned
Prior to and during the pandemic, relatively little was stated
about the expectations of modelling. Modellers may not have
been clear about what models can and cannot do during an
epidemic, or have been fully aware of policy-maker needs. Some
previous commentaries [6,7] discussed the role and limitations
of modelling in addressing infectious disease control issues, but
not speciﬁcally during an emergency response, which calls for
different decision-making, needs, and expectations.With limited
time, decision-makers need to make rapid decisions, and may
not have the time to carefully evaluate models and their results.
Was the role of modelling to accurately predict the impact
and timing of the pandemic? Throughout the earlier part of the
pandemic, several modellers offered estimates that were
somewhat divergent and changed substantially as the pandemic
progressed. For example, in late April 2009, Brockmann et al.
[8,9] predicted that the USA would experience 1700 cases by
the end of May (an estimate published by the New York Times).
However, 8 days after their initial prediction, their estimate
changed to 40 000 cases, and, 3 days later, it changed again to
90 000 cases. In September 2009, Balcan et al. [10] published
their predictions for the timing of the pandemic peak and the
daily incidence during the peak for several countries. A 2012
publication compared their predictions with available data.
Although the observed peak week fell no more than 2 weeks
outside of their predictions for 50% of the countries, and within
4 weeks of their predictions for 95% of the countries, the
model had generally overestimated attack rates (and therefore
peak incidence) derived from surveillance systems and sero-
logical studies [11]. Ultimately, none of these models predicted
the exact number of cases, severity and impact of the pandemic,
which proved to be milder than initially anticipated [12].
However, are accurate predictions the norm in other
industries that more routinely use models for decision support?
Although meteorological models can help to predict general
weather trends or weather front paths, they may struggle to
generate speciﬁc numbers on the inches of precipitation, the
square kilometres affected by a weather pattern, the precise
duration of a heat wave that will occur in 2 months, and the day
on which temperatures will peak during the summer. These
limitations are present despite the availability of considerably
more real-time meteorological data than epidemic data.
Similarly, transportation models cannot always predict trafﬁc
jams, investment models are rarely able to pinpoint the future
value of an investment (e.g. stock or real estate), and military
models can miss the exact location and movements of the
adversary several months into the future. In general, divining
the precise future tends to be challenging, especially when
real-time data are limited (see Challenge 2) and the issue/
problem spans large geographical areas and multiple countries.
As Table 1 shows, modellers need to communicate more
clearly what models can and cannot do. Modelling may be the
only method for studying certain situations, such as when
prospective studies are not feasible and when retrospective
data may not be generalizable to the current situation. Much
TABLE 1. Challenges in H1N1 pandemic modelling and lessons learned
Challenge Lessons learned
1 Expectations of modelling were not clearly deﬁned Establish and disseminate the expectations and limitations of modelling (e.g. help plan interventions to
accommodate different possibilities vs. forecast exact course of epidemic)
2 Appropriate real-time data were not readily available Establish national and international surveillance and information systems
Determine the data needed to help models make better predictions
3 Modelling results were not generated, shared, or
disseminated in time
Begin working with decision-makers routinely before the epidemic occurs
Expedite journal review and publication cycles during the emergency situation
Establish other venues for disseminating results that also protect the work of the investigators
Provide career-advancement incentives to modellers who perform public service
4 Decision-makers could not always decipher the
structure and assumptions of the models
Increase the transparency of model construction and assumptions for decision-makers
Avoid utilizing unnecessarily complex models
Do not try to use one model to address all questions
Clearly state the strengths and weaknesses of each model
5 Models varied in representing interventions Increase the transparency of intervention representation
Utilize extensive sensitivity analyses
Work with decision-makers to make intervention representations relevant and realistic
6 Modelling varied in the results or outcome measures
reported
Work with decision-makers to identify what outcomes they would be interested in
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like weather, ﬁnancial, military, educational and other fore-
casts, models are good at examining different possibilities and
helping to prepare strategies that can accommodate these
possibilities. However, models in many ﬁelds may struggle to
serve as crystal balls that can make accurate predictions
further than several weeks into the future. Too many
uncertainties and chance elements could shift an epidemic.
This is not to say that predictions should not be attempted.
As with weather and ﬁnancial forecasts, better available
real-time data could lead to better predictions in the future.
Challenge 2: appropriate real-time data were not readily
available
Just as meteorological models depend on real-time data on
wind currents, temperature, barometric pressure, cloud
patterns, and other important parameters, epidemic models
require real-time data on disease incidence and prevalence,
morbidity, mortality, prior exposure, healthcare-seeking
behaviour and the implementation of countermeasures such
as vaccination to have a chance of accurately predicting the
course of the epidemic. However, without a central data
repository and integrated national information system, most of
these disease data either were not readily available or had to
be pieced together from various disparate sources. In some
cases, estimates and approximate calculations had to be used
to transform available data into useful measures. For instance,
converting inﬂuenza-like illness counts from sentinel surveil-
lance sites into actual inﬂuenza cases necessitated estimates of
the percentage of inﬂuenza-like illness cases that were actually
inﬂuenza [13]. Additional delays occurred between data being
gathered and made available to modellers. Different healthcare
facilities and organizations did not always readily share data,
for reasons ranging from patient privacy protection concerns
to information system limitations to cost to competitive
concerns [14,15].
The dearth of real-time data led many modellers to make
assumptions that, in turn, limited the ability of the models to
accurately forecast the course of the pandemic. For example, a
number of modellers used data from previous pandemics or
inﬂuenza seasons to calibrate their models [16,17]. However,
the course of the 2009 pandemic did not parallel that of
previous pandemics (each of which has been unique in its
progression) or inﬂuenza seasons. In fact, morbidity and
mortality estimates for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic changed
dramatically from the beginning of the pandemic, leading to
wide variations in critical-care demand projections [18].
Moreover, much of the available data came from particular
limited geographical regions, forcing modellers to use data
from one location to represent another location. For instance,
Australian modellers employing the CDC’s FluSurge model
with US data from previous pandemics found the model to
overestimate the severity of the H1N1 pandemic until it was
updated with more current data on attack rates, hospitaliza-
tion incidence, and mortality rates [19]. Indeed, the basic
reproduction numbers (R0) varied across different countries,
highlighting the need for real-time data collection across many
different locations and environments [20].
As Table 1 shows, installing worldwide surveillance net-
works and information systems to provide real-time data on
the progress of a pandemic could greatly enhance the ability of
modelling to assist decision-makers. Identifying the type of data
needed to make better predictions and the impact or value of
having this information could enable modelling to play an
important role in guiding the development and implementation
of such networks, systems, and associated tools.
Challenge 3: modelling results were not generated, shared, or
disseminated in time
Fig. 1 shows how the timing of modelling publications (gleaned
from a MEDLINE search over the dates 1 April 2009 to 31
August 2010, with combinations of the following keywords:
model, modeling, modelling, simulation, H1N1, pandemic, and
inﬂuenza) corresponded to the epidemic curve in the US (which
was not too dissimilar from the curves in other parts of the
world). As can be seen, the publication (and thus dissemination)
of most studies occurred well after the early part of the
pandemic (and, in the majority of cases, after the pandemic
peak), often too late to inﬂuence decision-making. When H1N1
activity in the US peaked in October 2009, fewer than 40
modelling articles had been published. Although some of these
study authors may have shared their results with decision-
makers well before publication, many may not have done so,
especially as academic career advancement may be tied more
closely to publication in journals than to public service.
Fig. 1 also reveals that full-scale modelling activities did not
start until a month or two into the pandemic, after news of the
new strain emerged from Mexico in April 2009. Prior to the
pandemic, many investigators had not been actively working
with decision-makers, and therefore needed time to establish
working relationships and ramp up activities. For example,
extensive interactions between the National Institute of Gen-
eral Medical Sciences Models of Infectious Disease Agent Study
network and Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness
and Response, US Department of Health and Human Services
and Department of Homeland Security did not begin until late
spring and early summer. For example, the embedding of
investigators (Bruce Y. Lee of the University of Pittsburgh and
Shawn T. Brown of the Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center) in
the Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and
Response did not occur until September 2009 [27].
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Although part of the delay in results dissemination reﬂected
the later start in modelling activities, journal review and
publication time also played a role. Even though some journals
tried to fast-track pandemic-relevant studies, time-lags still
occurred, especially as many potential reviewers may have been
quite occupied by the pandemic. The existence and formation
of modelling networks did facilitate some communication
among modellers and between modellers and decision-makers.
The Models of Infectious Disease Agent Study network formed
working groups to share modelling data sources and results,
and coordinate interactions with decision-makers. TheWHO’s
informal mathematical modelling network convened in July
2009 [20]. However, it is unclear how much competition
among modellers may have hindered cooperation, and whether
data and results sharing occurred to the fullest possible extent.
The establishment of certain ad hoc communication chan-
nels was aimed at facilitating data and results sharing. Two
prominent examples were the Program for Monitoring
Emerging Diseases (ProMED)-mail, a programme of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases serving electronic,
Internet-based, emerging disease and outbreak detection and
reporting, and PLOS Currents: Inﬂuenza, an online publication
channel that aimed to minimize the publication delay and
published peer-reviewed content that was citable and publicly
archived in PubMed and indexed by Scopus. The WHO formed
a mathematical modelling network, through which some
modellers conﬁdentially disclosed unpublished results across
countries, but this work remained largely within the group
during much of the pandemic [28]. Although modelling results
were eventually published, many recommendations and actions
stemming from these results were not [28].
Although these channels were helpful, they did not go far
enough. As Table 1 shows, mechanisms and incentives to
facilitate information-sharing will be important for future
emergencies. Otherwise, the world will not fully beneﬁt from
the potential insights that modellers can offer.
Challenge 4: decision-makers could not always decipher the
structure and assumptions of the models
The types of model utilized ranged from decision-analytical to
compartment to large-scale agent-based models. The complex-
ity of the models, even within each model category, varied
substantially. A review of the methods sections of many
publications revealed descriptions such as ‘spatially structured
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FIG. 1. Timeline of H1N1 pandemic and modelling publications. Sources: pandemic timeline [21–25], and US case incidence [26].
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meta-population approach’ [29], ‘geographical backcalculation
model’ [30], ‘stochastic, spatially structured, individual-based
discrete time simulation’ [31], ‘age and risk group structured
deterministic transmission dynamic model’ [32], ‘agent-based,
social contact network model’ [33], ‘network-based statistical
approach’ [34], ‘transmission model for which parameters are
estimated from the data via Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling
and data augmentation techniques’ [35], ‘discrete time epidemic
model’ [36], ‘individual-based stochastic simulation model’ [37],
‘age-structured transmission model is embedded within a
Bayesian framework’ [38], ‘deterministic compartmental model’
[39], and ‘logistic models involving generalized estimating
equations’ [40]. Such terminology may be familiar among
modellers, but may not resonate with decision-makers. Deci-
sion-makers may have concerns about models being ‘black
boxes,’ opaque constructs understood only by the persons who
built the model. The use of language that is more accessible to
the lay audience could facilitate decision-makers’ understanding
of and consequently trust in a model.
Although communication may be part of the problem, some
models may, in fact, be too complex for the questions of
interest. Excessively complex models violate the principle of
parsimony, i.e. utilization of the simplest model that can
adequately answer the question of interest. In fact, the goal of
modelling is often to simplify a system or problem to make it
more readily addressable. This is in contrast to constructing a
single ‘uber-model’ that includes excessive detail and aims to
address every possible question. Very complex models may
prevent decision-makers from discerning why different models
are yielding different results.
Challenge 5: modelling studies varied in intervention
representations and reported results
Various modelling studies represented interventions in vastly
different manners, causing substantial variation in results. This
was especially true with vaccination, for which efﬁcacy, number
of doses, timing of availability and administration, and coverage
are key parameters. Earlier vaccination, higher coverage and
greater efﬁcacy can all signiﬁcantly improve the value of a
vaccine. As the timing of vaccine availability was known only to
a limited number of people involved in vaccine procurement,
manufacturing, and distribution, many modellers had to make
simplifying (and incorrect) assumptions: for example, the
vaccines are administered at once to the population on a
particular day, or at a steady rate throughout the beginning of
the pandemic. As vaccine development, procurement and
manufacturing mobilization were emergent and complex,
predictions of when the vaccines would be available continued
to change throughout the pandemic. Additionally, questions
remained concerning the population’s acceptance of and
access to a novel strain vaccine, complicating representations
of vaccination coverage. Moreover, time constraints prevented
extensive testing and the establishment of vaccine efﬁcacy.
Some, but not all, studies tried to overcome the uncertainty
about vaccine efﬁcacy and vaccination timing and coverage by
sensitivity analyses ranging these parameter values. However,
even when sensitivity analyses were conducted, discrepancies
existed among the ranges explored. For example, a study by
Lugner et al. [41] ranged vaccination coverage from 45% to
90% vs. 20–100% for a study by Lee et al. [42]. Brouwers et al.
[43] ranged vaccine efﬁcacy after one dose between 10% and
100%, whereas Conway et al. [44] assumed vaccine efﬁcacy to
be at least 90%. Dang et al. [45] modelled vaccination
programmes lasting for between 1 and 6 months, whereas
Kenah et al. [46] modelled all vaccinations as occurring at
once. Lee et al. [47] incorporated vaccine prioritization
strategies into studies of vaccination impact, whereas Bajardi
et al. [29] assumed uniform vaccine administration across the
population. Differing ranges and assumptions could lead to
different results, which could confuse decision-makers who did
not have the time to carefully read through the methods
sections of studies. Therefore, the modelling community may
want to identify clearer ways of communicating key differences
in the manner of representing interventions.
Challenge 6: modelling studies did not always present the
results or outcomes that are useful to decision-makers
Emergencies may require special results or outcomes that are
different from those normally reported in standard scientiﬁc
settings. A review of the papers published reveals many
standard epidemic parameters, such as reproductive number
[16], epidemic doubling time [30], attack rates [48], relative
susceptibility by age [40], incidence [49], prevalence [46],
relative transmission rates [50], deaths [43], and hospitaliza-
tions [18], and some standard health economic outcomes,
such as incremental cost-effectiveness ratio [32], qual-
ity-adjusted life-years [41], healthcare costs [33], and produc-
tivity losses [42]. Whereas some of these measures, such as
costs by sector (e.g. productivity and healthcare costs), cost
per case averted, incidence, prevalence, and attack rates, are of
interest during an emergency, others that are more scientif-
ically oriented may not resonate as well with decision-makers.
For example, cost-effectiveness ratios and quality-adjusted
life-years may be less relevant during emergency situations.
The Successes
Despite the aforementioned challenges, modelling seemed to
make important contributions to the H1N1 pandemic
ª2013 The Authors
Clinical Microbiology and Infection ª2013 European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 19, 1014–1022
1018 Clinical Microbiology and Infection, Volume 19 Number 11, November 2013 CMI
response. Although models may have been inexact in predict-
ing the course of the pandemic, they may have been more
effective in shaping whether and how various interventions/
measures should be implemented. The published literature
represents only a fraction of the contributions that modelling
made to decision-making during the H1N1 pandemic, as a
considerable proportion of the direct work with decision-
makers may have been classiﬁed (e.g. working with data and
decisions that could not be disseminated to the general public)
and therefore not publishable. Moreover, much of the
modelling performed in close collaboration with decision-
makers was progressively iterative, continuously changing as
new information emerged and the nature of the questions and
decisions evolved, meaning that most of this intermedi-
ate-stage effort went unpublished. Additionally, much of the
modelling occurred behind the scenes, helping those in various
sectors to make decisions regarding production (e.g. manu-
facturers), procurement (e.g. purchasers and suppliers),
distribution, capacity planning and resource allocation (e.g.
hospitals and large employers), and investment (e.g. ﬁnancial
ﬁrms and other businesses). Therefore, the examples of
successes outlined below capture only a portion of the impact
that modelling had on decision-making:
Sample success 1: modelling characterized the role of social
distancing measures such as school closure
Early in the pandemic, the question emerged of whether
schools should be closed and other social distancing (i.e.
limiting person-to-person interactions to curtail virus spread)
measures should be implemented. Around this time, model-
ling suggested that short-term school closures may actually
boost peak incidence somewhat by keeping susceptible
students in ‘reserve’ during the school closure and then
releasing them when schools re-open to mix again and re-fuel
the epidemic. To be effective, school closure would have to
be long term, from before the peak to well after the peak
(over 8 weeks), which could be prohibitively expensive [51–
53]. Another study showed how the cost-effectiveness of
social distancing measures depends heavily on the infectivity
and case-fatality rate, suggesting that school closure would
only be cost-effective for a case-fatality rate of at least 1% and
an R0 of >1.6 [33]. Modelling also addressed other social
distancing measures, such as limiting mass gatherings, and
found that such a policy may not be helpful unless it is
implemented near the epidemic peak [54]. Additionally,
modelling studies (which showed that travel restrictions
would probably not prevent local H1N1 epidemics, and could
only delay such epidemics for a few weeks, at most) may have
inﬂuenced the fact that no mass travel restrictions were
enforced [55].
Sample success 2: modelling helped to guide data collection
Modellers were involved in investigating some prominent
outbreaks during the 2009 pandemic [56]. Two such outbreaks
occurred at a school in Queens, New York City [57] and a
school in Berks County, Pennsylvania [58]. Running models
and varying different input parameters helped to determine the
relative importance of each parameter.
Sample success 3: modelling helped to justify the value of the
vaccination programme
Modelling studies were fairly unanimous in showing vaccination
to be the most efﬁcacious (and cost-effective) available
countermeasure when delivered to the population in a timely
manner [44,48,59–64]. Even a vaccine with relatively low
efﬁcacy can help to mitigate the epidemic [32]. The most
important variables seem to be the timing of administration
and coverage, emphasizing the importance of establishing an
effective vaccine distribution system, and suggesting that
getting a vaccine out earlier is more important than developing
a ‘perfect’ vaccine, as long as the vaccine is safe. When vaccines
became available in October 2009 near the time of the second
peak, questions emerged over whether vaccination would be
too late to make a difference. However, a modelling study
demonstrated how continuing the vaccination programme
could prevent the emergence of a third pandemic wave,
thereby justifying the value of continuing vaccination even
during the descent of the second pandemic wave [65].
Sample success 4: modelling helped to prioritize target
populations for vaccination
As vaccines became available in limited quantities during the
autumn of 2009, decision-makers had to choose which
populations should receive vaccines ﬁrst [29]. Modelling runs
evaluated the impact of prioritizing different population
segments in different orders. Immunizing children ﬁrst may
best curtail transmission [44,66,67]. However, immunization
based on CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Prac-
tices prioritization instead may best reduce the combination of
transmission, morbidity, mortality, and costs, by protecting
high-risk individuals who are not children [47]. Modelling work
also showed how society and even high-income populations
would beneﬁt from low-income populations being adequately
immunized [68]. Low-income populations can extensively
spread the pathogen, owing to their higher population density,
heavy social mixing, and travel to other locations for work.
Sample success 5: modelling addressed the use of antiviral
medications
Another question that arose was whether to use antiviral
medications, both standard formulations and a new intrave-
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nous formulation, peramivir, which received accelerated
approval from the Food and Drug Administration. Antiviral
medications are most effective when administered within 24–
48 h of initial exposure to the virus, and, after this incubation
period, their efﬁcacy drops precipitously [69]. These qualities
make antiviral medications poor candidates as sole counter-
measures. However, modelling studies did support a role for
antiviral medications in combination with other mitigation
measures (e.g. to delay the epidemic peak if vaccination is
delayed) and the use of intravenous peramavir for patients
hospitalized with inﬂuenza-like illness [10,33,70,71].
Sample success 6: modelling helped with health system
preparedness planning
Although models did not necessarily accurately predict the
course or severity of the pandemic, they did help deci-
sion-makers to anticipate healthcare capacity needs under
different scenarios, something that would be difﬁcult to do
without models. During an emergency, healthcare systems
need to be ready for a variety of possible scenarios, as basing
planning solely on the anticipated course of a pandemic may
not leave room for unanticipated changes. For example,
disease severity data from the USA and Mexico helped to
estimate peak critical-care bed demand and peak ventilator
usage in England, and identify thresholds at which demand
would exceed capacity [18]. A similar study estimated
antibiotic and critical-care demand for several northern
hemisphere countries with varying vaccination campaigns,
complication rates, and lengths of stay in intensive-care units
[72].
Sample success 7: modellers and decision-makers gained a
better understanding of how to work with each other
It would have been too much to expect all to go smoothly the
ﬁrst time that modellers worked with decision-makers during
a global emergency. As mentioned before, expectations and
infrastructure were not established before modellers rushed
into the action. Decision-makers had to quickly learn what
modellers could offer, and modellers what decision-makers
needed. Fortunately, a milder than initially anticipated pan-
demic gave both sides a real-life educational opportunity with
regard to future preparations.
Conclusions
Modelling is widely used in many other industries and
professions to help decision-makers. The 2009 H1N1 pan-
demic marked the ﬁrst time that mathematical and computa-
tional modelling and simulation were used to help respond to a
worldwide infectious disease emergency. Although modelling
provided beneﬁts to decision-makers, several existing
challenges kept it from reaching its full potential during the
2009 pandemic, which, in many ways, served as practice and a
learning opportunity for both modellers and decision-makers.
Modellers can continue working with decision-makers
and other stakeholders to help overcome these challenges,
to be better prepared when the next emergency inevitably
arrives.
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